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ABSTRACT
The Bush Doctrine, or the proposal that allows the use of military
force preventively to address prospective attack from terrorists or
involving weapons of mass destruction, has been debated from
various normative and legal vantage points. In this article, we
introduce the new evaluative criterion that such military action must
also produce the desired outcomes of defeating opponents and
preventing future attacks. We test the efficacy of preventive military
actions over the last two centuries. We conclude that using military
force in a preventive fashion provides very limited, if any value, to
states that employ this strategy. At best, there is less than an even
chance of victory in such circumstances and this requires a full-scale
war. The utility of preventive strikes diminishes tremendously in
attacks short of war, and indeed the minimal success rate (around
1 Paul F. Diehl is the Henning Larsen Professor of Political Science and Professor of
Law at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Shyam Kulkarni is a Ph.D.
Candidate in Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The authors would like to thank Lesley Wexler, Tom Ginsburg, Charlotte Ku,
Alexander Balas, and the faculty at the University of Illinois Program in Law,
Behavior, and Social Sciences for their comments and suggestions.
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10%) is no better than using coercive diplomacy by merely
threatening force rather than actually using it. Preventive actions also
did not significantly delay the appearance of new security threats and
indeed such actions produce the conditions that enhance the
maintenance of international rivalries, rather than contributing to
their resolution. Finally, available evidence suggests that preventive
strikes are not well-suited to terrorist threats, and states might be
reluctant to employ them in any case. Studies of retaliation to
terrorist attacks find little value to the former, with no long term
deterrent effects.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' invasion of the Republic of Iraq ("Iraq") in
March 2003 was not in response to an armed attack or any particular
military action by the Saddam Hussein ("Hussein") regime against
the U.S. or its allies. Neither was such an attack imminent nor were
any human lives in danger at the time. Yet, the United States justified
its actions, in part, by reference to international law in what has
become known as the Bush Doctrine, 2 which is a "claim of authority
to use, unilaterally and without international authorization, high
levels of violence in order to arrest a development that is not yet
operational and hence is not yet directly threatening, but which, if
permitted to mature, could be neutralized only at a high, possibly
unacceptable, cost."3 The U.S. or Israel could also use such a
2 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9, 14 (2002), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/white
papers/USnss2002.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2010). The idea of preventive military
actions or "anticipatory self-defense" predates Bush Administration policy and
action, although its prominence is more recent. For a brief history, see Chapter 1 of
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 153-57
(2007). Note also that anticipatory self-defense is not necessarily the only law based
justification with respect to the invasion of Iraq. The United States and others might
have cited the Iraqi violation of the cease-fire agreement part of UN Resolution 687;
see Yoram Dinstein, Remarks, Self-Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L. L. PROC.147, 149 (2003).
3 W. Michael Reisman, Remarks, Self Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 142, 143 (2003).
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justification in any strike against Iranian nuclear facilities,4 or for
preventive strike targeting terrorist training bases or groups that post
a threat to national security.5
Even after the fall of the Hussein regime in Iraq, the Bush
Doctrine remains the subject of considerable debate. Among critics of
U.S. foreign policy, the Bush Doctrine is little more than a veiled
justification for building a U.S. empire and a dangerous precedent by
which powerful states could subjugate the weak.6 Among legal
scholars, the debates are less polemical and much more focused on
how preventive uses of force can fit into existing international legal
conceptions of self-defense. 7 Other analysts assume more of an
advocacy position, noting the deficiencies of the international legal
regime and advocating that the Bush Doctrine, or some variation of
it, should be incorporated into legal canon.8
Amidst all the controversy and competing positions, one
notable evaluation criterion has been lacking: does the Bush Doctrine
actually work in practice? That is, does it achieve its desired ends?
One might argue - philosophically or morally - in favor or against
the Bush Doctrine, but its appropriateness as a legal principle
depends fundamentally on its efficacy. If using military force
preventively does not remove threats or deter future challenges, then
the case for its legal recognition is largely rendered moot. Any time a
new legal rule is proposed, there is significant uncertainty as to its
outcomes, including those that are unintended. One way to evaluate
4 See Christian M. Henderson, The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United
States: The Pre-Emptive Use of Force and the Persistent Advocate, 15 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 4, 8 (2007).
See Thomas Hunter, Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on
Terrorism, OPERATIONAL STUDIES (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.operationalstudies.
com/mootw/Targeted%/ 20Killing%/ 20Research%/ 2OPaperOS.pdf.
6 Michael Cox, Empire, Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine, 30 REV. INT'L STUD.
585, 603 (2004).
See, e.g., Thomas R. Anderson, Legitimizing the New Imminence: Bridging the
Gap Between Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 261, 293
(2010).
8 See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The George W. Bush Administration: A
Retrospective: The "Bush Doctrine ": Can Preventive War Be Justified, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 843, 865 (2009) (concluding that the Bush Doctrine "fell within
the broad traditions of American strategic thought" and stating that a legal position
always forbiting preventative war would be incoherent).
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such proposals is to collect and analyze available empirical evidence
about its effects. Indeed, the evaluation standard of practical utility
has been adopted in assessing other legal controversies involving the
use of force.9 Implicitly, commentators seem to assume that the Bush
Doctrine is effective, or at least that effectiveness is a relevant
consideration, given that failure of other alternatives, many of them
diplomatic, must occur before preventive military force is justified;
such "last resort" standards in the face of failed alternatives only
carry validity if the final actions achieve what the alternatives could
not.1 0 Fortunately, in the case of the Bush Doctrine, some empirical
evidence is available to evaluate such claims and assumptions.
In this article, we provide the first empirical assessment of the
viability of the Bush Doctrine as a strategy for meeting threats to
international security. We do so by examining the record of states
launching military actions - do they win the wars that they start?
When military action is short of war, are they successful in those
ventures? Does such military action deter or prevent future military
challenges from the targeted opponent? Does the military action end
the long-term threat of the targeted state? Does the frequency of
terrorist actions decrease following the employment of military force?
Based on these analyses, we can determine whether actions permitted
by the Bush Doctrine are successful and thereby whether there might
be grounds for justifying such actions as part of international law.
We begin our analysis with an overview of the traditional
principles underlying international law and the use of force,
specifically self-defense and standards outlined by the United
Nations. We then move to an articulation of the Bush Doctrine and
the rationale underlying its purpose, where we will also identify
evidence that might indicate its effectiveness and thereby set the
stage for the empirical analysis of international conflict since 1816.
9 See John C. Yoo & Jide Nzelibe, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115
YALE L.J. 2512, 2524 (2006). For a dissenting view, see Paul F. Diehl & Tom
Ginsburg, Essay, Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors
Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1239, 1255 (2006).
'0 See, e.g, Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 864.
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II. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FORCE
Provisions for jus ad bello have a long tradition in
philosophical writings and customary law.11 In modern times, the
United Nations Charter ("Charter") has been the fundamental
starting point for defining when and how states might use military
force. The primary goal of the Charter was to create a system, based
in part on law, which would prevent the recurrence of the
devastating wars that characterized the first half of the twentieth
century. Nevertheless, the Charter provisions on the use of force
drew heavily on historical tradition. Fundamental to these rules was
Article 2, Paragraph 4, which states that: "All Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 12 Such a prohibition places a presumption against military
action, and thus any permitted uses of force have to be exceptions to
this limitation.
The primary exception to the prohibition against military
force is the long-recognized right of self-defense. Nevertheless, as
Christine Gray notes, "[t]he law on self-defence is the subject of the
most fundamental disagreement between states and between
writers."13 Still, states, similar to individuals, have the right to
respond to attacks by using military force themselves under some
conditions. This right is reflected in Article 51 of the Charter:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the
This refers to the law that regulates the conditions under which states can use
military force or go to war, as opposed to jus in bello, which deals with the rules
involving the conduct of war such as those involving protection of civilians and
prisoners of war.
12 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
13 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 114 (Malcom
Evans & Phoebe Okowa eds., 3rd ed. 2008).
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exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security1 4
This provision recognizes the right of collective as well as individual
self-defense with provisions for regional security organizations.1 5
The reference to an "inherent right" to self-defense reflects its
natural law origins and suggestive that such a right cannot be
completely abrogated by subsequent agreements or practice.
Nevertheless, Charter provisions and related rules regard the right of
self-defense as limited. Indeed, the trend in international law has
been toward greater restrictions on the use of force in general. 16 First,
the Charter requires that an "armed attack" occur before a state can
respond with military force on its own.1 7 In this formulation,
"anticipatory" self-defense in the face of yet unrealized threat is
insufficient justification for military action.18 Second, the right to take
military action is temporary, until the Security Council takes action,
presumably consistent with the collective security provisions
outlined in Chapter VII.19 Third, is the implicit restriction of
proportionality, in which states can take only actions necessary to
repel an attack and must not use military force in excess of the
original attack.20 Finally, self-defense is conceptualized as a right for
states and in response to attack from other states; non-state actors are
not accorded rights or obligations in this state-centric conception.
14 U.N. Charter art. 51.
5 Id.
16 See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE "GLOBAL
WAR ON TERROR" 6, 12 (2007).
17 U.N. Charter, art. 51.
1 In particular, such actions are not permitted with respect to terrorism. SeeArmed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), 2005-2006 I.C.J.Y.B. 229.
19 U.N. Charter art. 51.
20 See JUDITH GARDHAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 10 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2004).
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There is some doubt that the traditional Charter restrictions
were reflected in practice early on and were even less prevalent as
the Cold War developed. 21 Except for self-defense, there were a
number of modifications or caveats to the general prohibition against
military force. The one with the longest historical legacy was the right
of reprisal, which relates to the Biblical provision of "an eye for an
eye." Military reprisals were permitted when there was an initial
violation of international law and an unsatisfied demand, provided
that the response was proportional to the original offense. 22 Although
such actions would seem to be prohibited by Charter law, there is
some evidence that such rights continued to be recognized in
customary law after World War II.23
Beyond reprisals, the Definition of Aggression, adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in a 1975 resolution, sought to
define unacceptable uses of military force. 24 Yet it also carved out
exceptions to the Charter prohibitions for struggles in pursuit of
national self-determination, anti-racist actions, and efforts at freedom
from colonial domination:
Nothing in this Definition...could in any way
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and
independence, as derived from the Charter, of
peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to
in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination:
21 See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM (1993).
22 Naulilaa Arbitration (Germany v. Portugal), 2 Int. Arb. Awards 1013 (July 31,
1928).
23 See Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 425-27 (1969).
24 See Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Kampala, May 31-June 11, 2010, Resolution RC/Res. 6: The Crime of Aggression,
RC/9/11 (June 11, 2010) ("'[A]ct of aggression' means the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.").
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nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end
and to seek and receive support, in accordance with
the principles of the Charter and in conformity with
the above-mentioned Declaration.25
Of course, this resolution does not have the force of treaty law, and
Western objections to the above-quoted provision suggest that it does
not qualify as instant customary law either; unanimity or near un-
animity is required for such designation.24 Beyond these
qualifications, efforts have been made to carve out room for the use
of military forces in pursuit of other objectives valued by the
international community. Such objectives include those that fall
under the rubric of protecting democracy, 26 humanitarian
intervention, 27 and the "responsibility to protect,"28 to name a few of
the most prominent attempts. Nevertheless, most of these provisions
are not yet accepted law, or at the very least, are subject to
considerable debate.
The UN Charter does not permit the kind of preventive
military action envisioned in the Bush Doctrine. The standard
interpretation of the Charter is that self-defense is permissible only if
an actual armed attack occurs, 29 with no room for a looser standard.30
25 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Art. 7, U.N. Doc.A/RES/9890
(Dec. 14, 1974).
26 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 85 (1992) ("The international community long has asserted ... a right of
all states to take ... military action to enforce aspects of the democratic
entitlement... .").
27 THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: IDEAS INACTION 11,52 (2007)
("Of course military intervention may be undertaken for humanitarian motives... .").
28 Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": Humanitarian Concern
and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 720 (2007)
(defining the responsibility to prevent and stating that it may require military action);
see also Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military
Intervention, 84 INT'L AFFAIRS 615, 623 (2008) (stating that states acknowledge they
have a responsibility to protect their citizens and that the Security council is ready to
use non-consensual force).
29 Note that this also includes sending irregular forces to fight an opponent in
addition to traditional military invasions and the like. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14 (June 27).
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Whatever the legal status of the various exceptions noted above, none
give legitimacy to the Bush Doctrine. For such preventive actions to
be legal, provisions for anticipatory self-defense, or action prior to an
actual attack, must be allowed.
Anticipatory self-defense is permitted under another set of
criteria, but has questionable legal standing: the criteria outlined in
the Caroline affair.31 The Caroline affair occurred in 1837 and involved
a ship preparing to transport men and materials to rebellious forces
in Canada.32 British forces seized and burned the vessel in American
waters.3 3 The United States protested these actions and U.S. Secretary
of State, Daniel Webster, laid out a famous set of conditions before
preemptory military actions were permitted, specifically, the
"necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment of deliberation." 34 This declaration has
been widely cited and repeated over the last two centuries, but it is
not clear that customary practice has given it weight as international
law. Indeed, anticipatory self-defense has been only rarely cited by
states as justification for military action.35
Furthermore, the Caroline criteria are not sufficient to
legitimize the kinds of actions envisioned under the Bush Doctrine;
the former is designed to address preemptive strikes, whereas the
latter envisions circumstances of preventive war. Although the terms
preemption and prevention are used interchangeably in legal and
political discourse, they are quite distinct when applied to uses of
military force.36 Preemption involves taking action when an attack
30 See Yoram Dinstein, supra note 2, at 148; but see Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 29 (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting).
"TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
80-121 (Hunter Miller ed., Government Printing Office Vol. 4) (1934), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/br-I 842d.asp.
32 id.
3 4 Id. at Enclosure 1.
3 Gray, supra note 13, at 160-61, 163-64.
36 Jack S. Levy, Research Note, Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for
War, 40 WORLD POLITICS 82, 89-91 (1987); Jack S. Levy, Preventive War: Concepts
and Propositions, 37 INT'L INTERACTIONS 87, 88. See also Reisman, supra note 3, at
143 (making similar points between anticipatory self-defense and preemptive self-
defense).
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from an opponent is imminent, defined generally in terms of hours or
days, such as when an enemy's troops are massing near the border.
The logic is based on a tactical advantage, in that if a war is going to
occur anyway, striking the first blow might allow the initiating party
to be more successful, rather than responding to an attack that would
compromise its ability to engage in self-defense. In contrast, as noted
in the next section, the Bush Doctrine is preventive in character,
allowing military force against a longer-term threat (not when an
attack is immediate) and designed to eliminate future threats or
challenges to national security, as well as undesirable outcomes from
an attack) 7 In this way, it is a strategic rather than a tactical decision
in the military sense. Thus, a strike against Iranian nuclear facilities is
not concordant with Caroline provisions for anticipatory self-defense,
given that a nuclear capable Iran, much less a nuclear attack from the
state, is at best a few years away.3 8
Although some controversy exists over the exact require-
ments for the use of military force in jus ad bello, the Bush Doctrine
represents a significant step beyond what has been proposed as
exceptions or qualifications to the Charter's requirements for self-
defense. The consensus opinion is that, as currently configured, the
Bush Doctrine is a violation of international law.39
See infra Part III.
See generally Iran's Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/info/iran-nuclear-program/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
3 O'Connell, supra note 16, at 15; see Michael J. Glennon, Remarks, Self Defense in
an Age of Terrorism, 97 AM Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC 150, 150-51 (2003). But see
Benjamin Langille, Comment, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush Doctrine
Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 145, 146 (2003); Lucy Martinez, September ll', Iraq and the
Doctrine ofAnticipatory Self-Defense, 72 UMKC L. REV. 123, 184-85 (2003).
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III. THE BUSH DOCTRINE
Although the purported right of states to take preventive
action has been labeled with the name of President George W. Bush,
there is a longer history to such claims in the U.S. and beyond.40
President Bush's immediate predecessors each presented policies
consistent with the Bush Doctrine.4' Yet, the Bush Doctrine itself
dates to the aftermath of the September 11th (9/11) attacks in 2001.
Rather than a fully articulated set of legal principles, the Bush
Doctrine is better understood as a claim that the offensive use of
military force is legitimate, both politically and legally, when faced
with certain kinds of threats - specifically, with respect to terrorism
and to rogue states pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Such
justification took place in the context of specific threats against the
U.S., but as a result, the assertions took the form of general American
policies.
In light of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. developed a policy in its
September 2002 National Security Strategy that "our best defense is a
good offense" and that the U.S. will act prior to any attack if
necessary: "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise
our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and
our country."42 Less than six months later, then President George W.
Bush expanded the potential targets of preventive actions to include
dictatorial regimes that were pursuing weapons of mass destruction,
specifically Iraq.43
40 W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, Centennial Essay: The Past and
Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 526-27
(2003) (summarizing recent history in regards to what has become known as
"preemptive self-defense").
41 See generally Alan Dowd, Obama: The Bush Doctrine 2.0, WORLD POL. REV.
(Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5359/obama-the-bush-
doctrine-2-0 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (stating that President Obama has yet to
release publicly his own national security strategy so it is unclear whether he will
repudiate the Bush Doctrine as suggested during his presidential campaign or merely
adopt with his own modifications).
42 National Security Council, supra note 2, at part III.
4'' George W. Bush, President of the U.S., 2003 State of the Union Address (Jan. 28,
2003), available at http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/bushstun2003.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2010).
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Some have said we must not act until the threat is
imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants
announced their intentions, politely putting us on
notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to
fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and
















Figure 1: The Timing of Action: UN Charter, Caroline Criteria,
and the Bush Doctrine
The major difference between the Bush Doctrine and other
rules concerning the use of force revolve around the timing of the
action in relation to the occurrence of a prospective attack. Figure 1
summarizes the differences between the Charter rules, the Caroline
criteria (or preemptive strikes), and the Bush Doctrine (or preventive
strikes). Charter provisions allow military actions only after an actual
attack has occurred. Presumably, self-defense is permissible
immediately after the attack has occurred, but this right is not
unlimited in time. States may take action only for as long as
necessary to repel an invader or until the threat has been removed.




WORTH A POUND OF CURE?
is generally a short period extending no more than year or two.45
There are also set criteria to determine the timing of action in
practice. The Caroline criteria permit military action only immediately
before an attack occurs, as soon as indications are that such an attack
is imminent. Although an exact point cannot be determined, one
might presume that the window is quite narrow; it could be as little
as hours and no longer than days or a week. The Caroline standard
does not preclude defensive actions once a war has begun, so it
would seem that military action could continue as long as necessary,
similar to the Charter rules. 46
The Bush Doctrine and preventive actions are much less
precise in specifying the time for action. Defensive strikes occur
before an attack occurs, but this could be weeks or years before a
prospective attack and there is no explicit benchmark on how likely
the military attack would have to be before a preventive action is
justified.4 7 Power transition theorists note that China will surpass the
United States in material capabilities sometime in the middle 21st
century and such a transition point has been associated with a major
power war initiated by the rising state in the past.48 Taking this as a
cue, preventive action could extend back 40 years from the possible
attack as well as any time up to the actual attack. The purpose of
Bush Doctrine actions is to foreclose an attack, and therefore, there is
no need to take defensive actions later as is the case with Charter or
Caroline based actions.
U.S. policy has not specified conditions under which
preventive strikes would be permitted nor ancillary rules associated
with their use, although presumably other laws of war (e.g., jus in
45 Kevin Wang & James Lee Ray, Beginners and Winners: The Fate of Initiators of
Interstate Wars Involving Great Powers Since 1495, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 139, 151
(1994).
46 O'Connell, supra note 16, at 17-18; see also Michael Skopets, Comment, Battered
Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of Self-Defence in
International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 767, 768 (2006).
47 O'Connell, supra note 16, at 39.
48 Douglas Lemke & Ronald L. Tammen, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of
China, 29 INT'L INTERACTIONS, 269, 270 (2003). See Ronald Tammen & Jacek
Kugler, Power Transition and China-US Conflicts, 1 CHINESE J. OF INT'L POL. 35
(2006); see STEVE CHAN, CHINA, THE U.S., AND POWER-TRANSITION
THEORY: A CRITIQUE (2008).
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bello protections for civilians) would remain operative. In translating
the Bush Doctrine into legal provisions, commentators have offered a
series of recommendations. Robert Delahunty and John YOO 49 outline
a series of conditions under which preventive war might be justified:
(1) an announced grievance; (2) motivation to protects own or allies'
citizens; (3) some coalition of support; (4) following the failure of
peaceful means; and (5) proportional force.50 The first four conditions
are relatively straightforward, but it is not clear how one would
calculate proportionality given that no attack has occurred and any
estimate of what damage an attack rnight precipitate is highly
speculative.5 1 Such conditions, however, still leave the decision to use
force largely in the hands of states themselves.
Other scholars place greater restrictions on the use of force
prior to an armed attack and might require certification of outside
authorities. Lucy Martinez puts a burden of proof on the state
initiating force, adds the condition of imminence (which essentially
restricts anticipatory self-defense to preemptive strikes, excluding
preventive ones), and requires recourse to the Security Council for all
but the most immediate threats. 52 Even more restrictive, Thomas
Anderson suggests an "International Court of Threat Assessment," a
subsidiary of the Security Council, to adjudicate anticipatory self-
defense claims. 53
The legal rationale underlying the Bush Doctrine arises from
the changing character of warfare over time and the inadequacy of
Charter-based law to deal with these circumstances. Traditional rules
on the use of force have concentrated on states as the exclusive actors,
with individuals or groups only relevant as subjects of legal
protection in the use of those forces. Yet, in the last several decades,
non-state actors such as armed militias and terrorist groups have
undertaken military operations. Identifying responsible actors and
their use of force is different than conventional military attack, and
the standard rules do not seem to apply. Terrorist attacks tend to be
49 These are scholarly opinions of the individuals written after official government
service and hence do not represent official U.S. policy.
50 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8.
5 O'Connell, supra note 16, at 39.
52 Martinez, supra note 39, at 186-87.
5' Anderson, supra note 7, at 263, 285.
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single-shot events such that conventional self-defense responses are
not operative; there is no ongoing invasion or attack against which
one can respond. In such circumstances, laws of state responsibility
dictate that the victim state file a claim against the state where the
attack originated or against secondary state supporters of those
perpetrating the acts. Yet states are not responsible for actions of
terrorist groups unless the former exercise "effective control" over
the latter.5 4 Most often, however, states do not support or have
control over the groups operating within its borders. In the case of a
failed state, there might be no legitimate authority against whom a
claim might be directed. Furthermore, this presumes that the
geographic origin of the terrorist attack can even be determined; in
fact, the planning, financial support, and execution might involve
multiple states and not at all be transparent.55 Furthermore, groups
do not have legal status to have a claim directed against them
directly, even if in the unlikely event that they might be so inclined to
honor such legal responsibilities. The deterrent effect from traditional
self-defense may not be applicable or credible against non-state
actors and therefore they are not likely to be restrained in their
actions; preventive action is said to be necessary when deterrence
will not work.56
In addition, Charter-based self-defense provisions are
inadequate in cases of attack using weapons of mass destruction. A
nuclear attack could conceivably wipe out a target state's military
forces or government structures, such that the ability to launch self-
defense actions are precluded. As W. Michael Reisman explains:
The introduction of vastly more destructive and
rapidly delivered weapons began to undercut the
54 Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001); Derek Jinks, Remarks,
Self Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 144, 145-46
(2003).
5 But see Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes," 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 585, 588 (2003) (holding a contrary view on the adequacy of state responsibility
law).
56 Olumide K. Obayemi, Legal Standards Governing Pre-emptive Strikes and
Forcible Measures of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter and
General International Lav, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & CoMP. L. 19, 23-24 (2006).
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cogency of that [UN Charter] legal regime. The reason
was simple: a meaningful self-defense could be
irretrievably lost if an adversary with much more
destructive weapons and poised to attack had to
initiate (in effect, accomplish) its attack before a right
of self-defense came into operation.5 7
In the case of geographically small states such as Israel, a
large portion of society would be destroyed following a nuclear
attack.58 The magnitude of the harm is said to be so great that waiting
for an attack is an unreasonable requirement; similar logic is used in
local state law concerning battered women and Battered Women's
Syndrome.5 9 Most analogous, however, is the precautionary prin-
ciple, one most notably applied in environmental law.60 According to
this principle, the mere prospect of significant harm - especially
whose magnitude is great and effects are irreversible - is sufficient
justification for government action. Uncertainty, or the probability of
an event occurring, must be weighed against the magnitude of the
harm; when catastrophic harm is possible (e.g., effects of global
warming), then the presumption is tilted in favor of action rather
than inaction. Such logic has even been directly applied to the Bush
Doctrine; political figures have used rhetoric consistent with the
5 Reisman, supra note 3 at 142.
58 Matthew Fuhrmann & Sarah Kreps, Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and
Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000, 54 J. CONFLICT RESOL.831,
833, 853 (2010) (states are willing to accept substantial costs and potential
international condemnation in order to eliminate the threat).
5 See Michael Skopets, Comment, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the
Imminence Requirement of Self-Defense in International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
753, 756 (2006) (linking battered woman's defense to state self-defense). But see,
e.g., Onder Bakircioglu, The Right to Self-Defence in National and International
Law: The Role of the Imminence Requirement, 19 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 31
(2009) (arguing that in the case of international relations, there is no systematic
abuse that causes mental conditions, unlike in a domestic abuse case).
60 James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 2 (1991 );See CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 61 (2005).
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precautionary principle in justifying preventive strikes, 61 and
scholars have looked at terrorism and nuclear war in the context of
catastrophic risk.62
In seeking to address catastrophic risks, the proportionality
requirement for use of force is more easily determined and satisfied.
Any military action to destroy weapons of mass destruction would
presumably have fewer negative consequences (e.g., less destruction,
fewer lives lost) than an attack using those weapons. Thus, pre-
ventive strikes would not produce a disproportionate action, but
indeed lead to more limited use of force than would otherwise be the
case. This is certainly one of the bases for Israeli strikes against Iraqi
(1981) and Syrian (2007) nuclear facilities, respectively. 63
Critics of the Bush Doctrine cite its imprecision and the lack
of clear standards for its application. The Bush Doctrine would create
a right that nominally is open to all, but a de facto one that would be
exercised primarily only by those with the military capabilities to do
so - the most powerful states in the international system. 64 Only
major power states would generally have the intelligence capabilities
to detect specific long-term threats, and only those same states would
be able to launch effective preventive military action. In addition,
allowing further uses of military force opens up the possibility that
some states, including the U.S., might exploit the Bush Doctrine,
using it as a justification for a range of military actions.65
61 See Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution Against Terrorism, 9 J. RISIK
RES. 393, 395 (2006).
62 Gary Ackerman & William Potter, Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism: A
Preventable Risk, in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK (Nick Bostrom & Milan Cirkovic
eds., 2008); see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE
(2004); Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 Micl. J. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (2009).
63 See Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and
Nuclear Proliferation Risks, 36 INT'L SEC. 101, 132 (2001), for information about
Israel's strike on Iraq; see also Leonard S. Spector & Avner Cohen, Israel's
Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime (2008),
http://mail.gees.org/documentos/Documen-03079.pdf, for information about Israel's
strike on Syria.
64 O'Connell, supra note 16, at 39.
65 MICHAEL W. DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN INTER-
NATIONAL CONFLICT 50, 56 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008).
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There have been various arguments constructed for regarding
the Bush Doctrine as accepted international law. These involve
rationales based on instant custom, 66  jus cogens, 67  and
opinionecessitatis.68 Nevertheless, there is little indication that the Bush
Doctrine is accepted law or practice. No state has explicitly adopted
this position, and few states seem willing to express over support for
it.69 As noted above, the Bush Doctrine is contrary to the Charter and
even to the Caroline criteria. 70 State practice with respect to
anticipatory self-defense has been so rare as to indicate that new
custom has not been established,71 nor have the conditions that
would make it established international law been fulfilled.72
As its legal status is, at best, uncertain, there are even more
unanswered questions about the effectiveness of the Bush Doctrine.
What would be evidence that the Bush Doctrine achieved its goals of
removing threats? With respect to preventing terrorist threats, it is
difficult to identify objective indicators. In seeking to detect the
proverbial "dogs that do not bark," one would need to gauge
whether military strikes deterred or prevented terrorist acts that
would have happened otherwise. Of course, it is all but impossible to
resolve that counterfactual: how can one determine whether a
terrorist attack would have occurred had it not been for the military
action? In a related fashion, if one were to employ the avoidance of
catastrophic events, such as nuclear war or a massive terrorist attack,
the net result would almost always be a positive assessment given
the absence of the former and the rarity of the latter; it would also be
66 Langille, supra note 39, at 149-5 1.
67 David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee, A. Casey & Mark Wendell DeLaquil, War,
International Lav, And Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New
Century Preemption and Law in the Tventy First Century, 5 CHIl. J. INT'L L. 467,
476 (2005) (Jus Congens refers to preemptory norms of international law that
reflects the highest values of the international community and from whom no
derogation is permitted).
68 See Henderson, supra note 4 (Opinionecessitatis means that the action involved is
necessary or unavoidable).
69 See Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 40, 537.
70S ee supra pp. 11-13.
71 David A. Sadoff, Article, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 523, 572 (2009).
72 Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary International
Law?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 457, 461 (2004).
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very difficult to tie such "successes" to any military action, as
opposed to other factors. Further complicating things is the rarity of
Bush Doctrine actions or those explicitly justified along those lines.
Indeed, even preemptive wars, which are more restrictive than
preventive actions and include the condition of imminent threat, do
not often occur.73
Despite these limitations, there are observable behaviors that
can be used to assess the viability of preventive uses of force. One can
look broadly at the success rate of uses of military force by the state
that first undertook militarized actions in any confrontation; success
can be considered both in short and long-term perspective. With
respect to full-scale wars, the Bush Doctrine suggests that the initiator
of such wars should be victorious; that is, if a state uses military force
first, it must win in order to justify its actions.74 Whether fighting the
"war on terrorism" or against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, U.S.
political and military leaders have repeatedly used the words
"victory" or "win" to describe their preferred outcomes, although it
is not always clear what these terms signify in those contexts. 75 Yet,
wars are only a subset of military actions and a relatively small
subset at that. One might argue that an effective military action is one
where the objectives are achieved without the conflict escalating to
full-scale war. That is, preventive action that defeats an opponent
without the costs (i.e., time, lives, and resources) of war is clearly
preferable to successful war initiation. Thus, one can look at the
success rates of states that initiate military force, even when such
actions do not lead to war; an example would be a bombing raid
against an opponent's military or territorial bases.
73 Dan Reiter, Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never
Happen, 20 INT'L SEC. 5, 6 (1995).
74 Scholars arguing for a more relaxed standard for preventive military action often
justify the desirability of such actions on results that could only emerge from victory.
See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 847 ("intervening powers would also be
deploying force to counteract a threat of violence - a threat that would be large in
scale"); But see, Henderson, supra note 4, at 5; Anderson, supra note 7 at 265
(arguing an effort that is not victorious is unlikely to have this result.).
75 See generally Philip H. Gordon, Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight
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In making the assessments above, there can be a simple
determination of what percentage of military actions result in victory.
Yet, a more nuanced assessment would include a comparative
analysis with actions that fall short of military force. Is initiating
military force superior to merely threatening it or other alternative
actions? Many justifications of the Bush Doctrine assume that this is
the case or at least that military force is appropriate when lesser
actions have failed. 76 A comparison of success rates between actual
uses of military force and merely threats can provide insight into this
claim.
The above tests of Bush Doctrine effectiveness deal with the
ability of military force to produce desirable outcomes in the short-
term. This is important, but part of the purpose of using military
force is to forestall future challenges or attacks from opponents. Thus,
another measure of Bush Doctrine effectiveness is its ability to deter
or delay future attacks against the state that used military force first.
To do this, one can look at whether such attack occurred in a period
following the preventive action or whether any actions were delayed
relative to some baseline predicated on past behavior. In the specific
case of terrorism, an assessment can be made when comparing
attacks following the preventive action against the baseline rate of
attacks prior to the action; this allows one to consider the effect of
degrading extant terrorist capability as well as deterring further
actions. This gives us some clues as to the long-term efficacy of uses
of force.
Finally, any empirical evaluation of the Bush Doctrine should
address the validity of the criticisms directed at it. One cannot
evaluate how states can potentially use the right to use force in the
future directly. Yet, there can be reference to patterns of behavior in
the past to project how anticipatory self-defense might be used. The
Bush Doctrine has been criticized as a tool available largely or
exclusively to powerful states.77 Thus, one can examine previous
initiations of war and military force both for their frequency and
76 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 846; Gardner, supra note 55, at 589;
Obayemi, supra note 56, at 19-20; see generally Rosana Vatanparast, International
Law Versus The Preemptive Use of Force: Racing to Confront the Specter of a
Nuclear Iran, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 783 (2008).
n O'Connell, supra note 16, at 39; Paul, supra note 72, at 458.
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success rates with respect to the status of the states carrying out those
actions. Specifically, do major powers initiate military force more
often than weaker states, and are they more successful in those
efforts? If so, this would give some indication that instituting the
Bush Doctrine as international law would primarily benefit one
group of states, even as it would be a right available to all.78
IV. THE EMPIRICAL EFFICACY OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE
In order to assess the effect that a more permissive standard
for preventive military strikes would have, we examine the broad
historical record. We employ data on international conflict events
from the Correlates of War Project (the "COW Project"),
encompassing the most expansive and detailed data collections used
by scholars of international relations. 79 The first step is to consider the
success rate of states that initiated wars. We turn to the Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, which records all instances in
which at least one state displayed, threatened, or used military force
against another state over the period 1816 to 2001.80 We are initially
concerned with a subset of those disputes, namely full-scale wars.81
The state designated as the initiator is the one that first takes military
action; for our purposes, this akin to a preventive strike as the state
involved hopes that the result will be an outcome in its favor.
Outcomes of disputes and wars are classified into four categories
with reference to whether the initiator achieved its goals or not: (1)
victory; (2) losses; (3) stalemates; and (4) compromises. 82 Only the
78 Of course, it could be argued that preventive strikes launched by major powers
could have some spillover benefits to other states, especially those allied with the
initiators of the strikes.
79 CORRELATES OF WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (last visited Nov. 27,
2010).
so See Faten Ghoson et. al., The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding,
Rules, and Description, 21 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SC. 133 (2004).
8' CORRELATES OF WAR, supra note 79 (The COW Project identifies and codes these
as disputes with one thousand or more battle-related fatalities); See also MEREDITH
REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR: A DATA GUIDE TO
INTER-STATE, EXTRA-STATE, INTRA-STATE, AND NON-STATE WARS, 1816-2007
(2010).
82 There are nine potential outcomes specified in the MIDs dataset; victories for each
side, yields by each side, stalemates, compromises, releases, unclear outcomes, and
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first category can clearly be labeled a success for the Bush Doctrine
and similar military acts. For example, the U.S. invasion of Grenada
in 1983 led to the successful overthrow of the Cuban-backed
government on that island.8 3
Table 1 below displays the outcomes that initiators have
experienced in all wars. Several patterns emerge from the results.
Advocates of the Bush Doctrine will note that victory for the initiator
is the most frequent individual outcome, but this result is slightly
worse than the flip of a coin as all other outcomes combined are more
likely (>50%). Notably, war initiators lose more than a third of the
time, suggesting that preventive military action might actually leave
a state clearly worse off than had no action been taken.84 Even a
stalemate might be considered a failure given the high costs of war
and that the initiator is no better off than when the war started.
the joining of an ongoing war. Because releases pertain to the release of a fishing
boat these cases were dropped from our analysis; the seizure of a fishing boat, is not
in and of itself the type of situation consistent with a preventive strike. Similarly,
wars coded as 'joins ongoing war" were also removed from our analysis, as these
are not new conflicts. Finally, the categories of victories and yields were
compressed, such that victories by the initiator and yields by the recipient were
coded as victories for the initiator while victories by the recipient and yields by the
initiator were coded as losses for the initiator. Stalemates and unclear outcomes were
combined to indicate no clear winner in the confrontation. Cases with a missing
value for initiator or outcome were also dropped.
See generally Gary Williams, Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983, J. LATIN
AM. STUD., 1997, for more on the U.S. invasion of Grenada.
84 See, e.g., Wang & Lee Ray, supra note 49, at 150. Of course, it is impossible to
compare what would have happened if the initiator had not launched an attack and
the target state had struck first.
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Table 1 - Outcomes of Wars
The vast majority of military actions do not end in full-scale
war, and arguably an effective military strike would ideally achieve
the goals of the initiator without the need for escalation to intense
and protracted fighting (e.g., Israeli strike on the Osirak nuclear
reactor in Iraq - 1981).85 In Table 2, we consider only disputes that
involved the actual use of military force (beyond threats and displays
of military force), but did not escalate to full-scale war.






Table 2 - Outcomes of Disputes Involving the Use of Force,
Short of War
When the use of force is short of war, the chances of a victory
for the initiator go down substantially; barely more than 10% of the
military actions result in success. Losing the dispute is also unlikely,
with the most likely outcome being stalemate (more than three-
quarters of the cases). Thus, a state that initiates military force is most
likely to be faced with the status quo ante, less any political,
8' Of a total of 1495 disputes in the Correlates of War dataset, only 104 of them were
full-scale wars. See Table 1 and Table 2, supra part IV.
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diplomatic, or other costs attendant to being the aggressor in the
dispute.
A third cut at the same dispute data examines whether
actually using military force is necessary to achieve desirable
outcomes. Although the UN Charter prohibits "the threat as well as
the use of force,"86 the Bush Doctrine explicitly deals only with
military threats that are actually executed. Would allowing or
encouraging states to threaten military force be just as effective,
without the risks of escalation or the costs of military strikes and
wars? Table 3 examines the efficacy of threats or displays (e.g.,
sending a warship to a disputed area or mobilizing forces) in
militarized disputes. There is nearly an identical pattern to those
cases in which force was used: decisive outcomes are rare and results
that favor neither side are overwhelmingly the most probable
outcome. Thus, states apparently gain little by moving from mere
threat or display of force to actually taking limited military action.87






Table 3 - Outcomes of Disputes Involving Threats or
Displays of Force
In general, the previous three analyses indicate several things
about benefits of initiating military force to achieve certain policy
goals. First, states that use military force first, and therefore not in
self-defense, are more likely to win than lose. However, this is
misleading as evidence in support of the Bush Doctrine as the
likelihood of victory is only slightly greater than defeat under any
scenario. Second, except for full-scale wars, in which decisive
outcomes are more likely, the results of military actions produce
86 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
8 See Mary Caprioli & Peter Trumbore, First Use of Violent Force in Militarized
Interstate Disputes, 1980-2001, 43 J. PEACE RES. 741, 747-48 (2006).
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scenarios in which neither side is able to achieve its goals
(stalemates). Unless a state is willing to go to war with an opponent,
the purported benefits claimed by Bush Doctrine devotees will not be
realized. Even for major military enterprises, positive results are far
from assured, and any benefits must be weighed against the loss of
lives and other costs.
It is very difficult to assess the political or diplomatic costs of
preventive military action as they are diffuse, multi-dimensional, and
are often not apparent in the immediate aftermath of the action.
Nevertheless, the cost measured in human lives is more readily
available in the short run. Readers are no doubt familiar with the
figures on U.S. casualties (almost 4,500 dead as of September 2010)88
from actions in Iraq, not to mention the large number of Iraq civilians
who died as a result of the invasion.89 Yet, this case is really an
anomaly when viewed in broader historical context, even as such
exceptions are often very important events. Over 80% of militarized
disputes involve no fatalities for either the initiator or target states. 90
Furthermore, the belief that the target state will suffer more than the
state launching the preventive action is not borne out by the data;
there is virtually no difference between the casualties suffered by
initiators and target states on average.91 Thus, there is a low
likelihood of bearing costs in military lives when using preventive
military action. Yet as we noted above, the likelihood of achieving
desired results only becomes significant when there is a full-scale
war, and our analysis here indicates that battle deaths tend to be
8 iCasulties: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casual-
ties, ICASUALTIES.ORG, http://icasualties.org/ (last visited Nov 28, 2010).
89 The exact numbers are the subject of considerable dispute, with estimates varying
wildly. Compare Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of
Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey, 364 THE LANCET 1857, 1861 (2004) (proposing that
over 100,000 people have died since the war began in 2003), with Michael Spagat et
al., Estimating War Deaths: An Arena of Contestation, 53 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 934-
36 (2009) (arguing that death estimates from the Iraq war have been highly
criticized, comparing the estimate 601,000 deaths reported by Lancet, a U.K.
medical journal, and the estimate provided by the World Health Organization, who
suggested there had been a total of 151,000 deaths).
90 Ghoson, supra note 80, at 150.
9 See Table 3, supra part IV.
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more equally shared between winner and loser, even as the
achievement of political goals might be less symmetrical.
A. Advantages for Major Powers?
The above analyses indicate that actions consistent with the
Bush Doctrine do not often yield their intended results. Yet, an
analysis focusing on all states misses the fact that more concrete
results may be discovered when considering only a subset of actors;
the major power states. Advocates of the Bush Doctrine are most
concerned with the utility for preventive action for the United
States.92 Critics of the doctrine have a similar concern, but from a
different normative perspective. They are concerned that any right to
anticipatory self-defense will be de facto available only to a subset of
powerful states, which may use it against weaker states to pursue
narrow national interests in contravention to the interests of the
international community. 93 Indeed, some of those suggesting a more
permissive standard of preemption argue that these actions can only
be legitimate if sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council;
they believe that in practice, only major powers would make use of
the Bush doctrine should it become codified.94
Is preventive military action only an option available to the
rich and powerful? We conducted the same analyses as those above,
but focused only on disputes involving major powers as designated
by the COW Project.95 We noted earlier that many states, including
weaker ones, initiate military force; this shows that a resort to
coercion simply not in the purview of the most powerful states in the
system. Yet we also know that major power states are dispro-
92 See, e.g, Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 844.
See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security
Doctrine and the Rule ofLaw, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 390 (2004).
94 Compare Anderson, supra note 7, at 266-67, 285 (arguing that the Bust doctrine is
extremely vague and ambiguous, and would require a separate tribunal to advise
states considering prophylactic self-defense), with DOYLE, supra note 65.
9 CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT, STATE SYSTEM MEMBERSHIP LIST, v2008.1,
available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (the list of major powers varies by
historical era and includes as few as five (e.g., in the 1950s - US, Soviet Union,
China, UK, and France) and as many as nine (before World War I) states since
1816).
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portionately involved in militarized conflict, because of their broad
and far-flung interests as well as their ability to project military force
across great distances. 96 Because the Bush Doctrine, as is true of any
claim for self-defense, is often juxtaposed as a choice of "attack" or
"be attacked," we examine the comparative outcomes of those
scenarios for major powers involved in wars .97
Outcome for Major Power As Initiators As Targets
Victories 30 (63.83%) 4 (33.33%)
Losses 12 (25.53%) 6 (50%)
Stalemate 4 (8.51%) 2 (16.66%)
Compromise 1 (2.13%) 0 (0%)
Total 47 (100%) 12 (100%)
Table 4 - Outcomes for Major Powers in Wars
There is some clear evidence that in the face of certain war,
major powers enjoy an advantage in taking the initiative; they are
more likely to win a war (just under two-thirds of the cases) than any
other outcome, and when they are attacked, their chances of winning
a war is drastically reduced (indeed, they are most likely to lose a
war). It is perhaps not surprising that major powers recognize this
disparity in outcomes and therefore have initiated 47 of the 59 wars
involving major powers from 1816 to 2001.98
When the sample shifts to include only disputes involving
military force short of war or merely threats/ displays of force, the
advantage for major power significantly dissipates. The likelihood of
major power victory ultimately shrinks to only 17% of the cases and
is barely better than the success rate than when the major power is
the target of attack. Stalemates are by far the most common outcome,
whether major powers took the first military action or not.
96 See Ghoson et al., supra note 80.
97 See infra Table 4.
98 This suggests "selection effects" in that major powers choose (a) to fight wars in
which there is strong expectation of victory, and (b) choose to initiate such wars
when the expectation is that war is inevitable.
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The analyses above were completed under conditions in
which the Bush Doctrine was illegal. A defender of the proposed rule
might argue that if preventive action were legalized, states taking
such action would be more likely to have other states (allies) join
them, and in turn, it would increase the success rates.99 Thus, we
empirically considered whether states initiating military force were
more successful when allies joined their side as compared to purely
unilateral actions.100 There is limited merit to the proposition. One the
one hand, victory in disputes does increase when supported by allies,
to slightly over 20% in all disputes, up from a little over 12% noted
above. Yet losing also increases proportionally 0 1 and stalemates
remain the most common outcome (still a majority of cases).
Although one cannot know exactly whether allied support would be
more common or not if the Bush Doctrine were legal, the empirical
record does not suggest that its effectiveness would increase
substantially.
B. Longer Term Efficacy
Preventive military actions are not merely designed to
achieve short term success, but also to limit future security threats.
Thus, we also evaluated the ability of military action to delay future
challenges. We would expect that only decisive outcomes (victories
for one side or the other) would have such an effect, as stalemates do
not resolve issues and a number of studies have shown that such
outcomes actually increase the likelihood of future conflict and in a
shorter period of time.102 Accordingly, we looked at the elapsed time
from the end of a militarized dispute to the beginning of a new
dispute between the same states; the longer the time period after a
99 We thank the faculty at the University of Illinois Program in Law, Behavior, and
Social Sciences for bringing up this argument.
100 Allies joined the initiating states in only 8 % of the dispute cases.
01 Increasing the likelihood of losing in the presence of allied support is probably a
"selection effect;" that is, other states sometimes come to the support of friends
when the task is difficult and there is a significant chance of failure.
102 Joseph Grieco, Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International
Conflicts, 1918-1994, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 295, 307-10 (2001); Paul Senese & Stephen
L. Quackenbush, Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on
Durations ofPeace, 65 J. POL. 696, 703-07 (2003).
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military action, the better the action was able to prevent or deter
security challenges.103
Conflicts with decisive outcomes1 04 reoccurred on average
every 8.8 years, while conflicts with non-decisive outcomes
reoccurred more often, every 7.1 years. Although this difference was
statistically significant, the effect was substantively small.
Additionally, this positive effect has to be weighed against the
probability of new wars emerging as a result of a more permissive
standard for preventive action under the Bush Doctrine; if new wars
are more likely to occur as a result of states launching preventive
strikes, then the positive effect of decisive outcomes might be
counterbalanced by the negative effect of more wars among new
pairs of states. One must also recognize that decisive outcomes are
still in the minority of outcomes for most kinds of military action.
Military action is frequently not merely designed to put off
longer-term threats, but end them altogether. Thus, there should also
be concern with how efficacious military actions are in terminating
long-term security threats. Here we can look to the extensive research
on international rivalries and long-standing militarized competitions
between the same pairs of states (e.g., India-Pakistan, Israel and her
Arab neighbors). How do military actions and their outcomes
influence the continuation or termination of rivalries? If such actions
can end rivalries, and the accompanying security threats, then there
is merit to the Bush Doctrine, even if the immediate impacts do not
meet expectations.
Research on international rivalries typically looks at an event
(e.g., a military confrontation) and its outcome (e.g., victory) and
compares the likelihood that a rivalry will terminate under those
circumstances as opposed to controlled conditions. Based on this
research, there are a number of clear patterns in rivalry dynamics.1 05
103 After a generation has passed, it is unlikely for additional "peace years" to have
been caused by the settlement of the previous conflict. Accordingly, we placed a
maximum of 20 years on the number of peace years after a conflict. Additionally,
final disputes between a pair of states that happened more recently than 1981 were
dropped, since we did not have an actual value on how long these countries had
remained at peace.
104 Victories and losses are decisive and all others are coded as indecisive.
105 See Gary Goertz et al., Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries, 49 J. OF
CONFLICT RES. 742 (2005).
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Military confrontations that end in stalemates only extend rivalries,
and repeated attempts to solve rivalries with coercion have the
consequence of locking-in hostile patterns and policies, making
rivalries more difficult to end later on. Thus, the model outcome for
preventive uses of force noted above - stalemate - does not eliminate
threats in the long run, but prolongs them. Even decisive outcomes in
wars are not effective mechanisms for ending rivalries. Most rivalries
do not end with one side defeating the other, but rather wars tend to
be scattered across the beginning, middle, and ends of rivalry life
cycles. In many rivalries, a loss in war incites the loser to continue the
conflict. For example, repeated defeats in wars (1948, 1956, 1967) only
emboldened Arab states to continue their rivalry with Israel; the
consequences of those wars (occupied territory and refugees) are the
centerpieces of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict to this day.106
Generally, rivalries do not end with the successful use of
force for one side or another. There often needs to be some major
change in the international environment or in one of the rivals. For
example, when there is a regime change in one of the rivals, such that
the two enemies are both democracies, rivalries are more likely to
end and states are no longer threats to one another.107 Nevertheless,
this is not necessarily an immediate effect as disputatious behavior
might continue in the absence of full democratic consolidation 08 or
even increase in the short run until the joint democracy effects are
felt.109 Furthermore, there are few cases in which military inter-
vention by the United States or other liberal powers has fostered
democracy in targeted states. 110 Thus, military actions are not the
mechanism to precipitate the conditions for rivalry termination.
1o6 MICHAEL N. BARNETT, DIALOGUES IN ARAB POLITICS (1998).
107 Paul R. Hensel et al., The Democratic Peace and Rivalries 62 J. OF POL. 1173,
1176 (2000); Brandon C. Prins & Ursula E. Daxecker, Committed to Peace: Liberal
Institutions and the Termination of Rivalry, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 17, 41-42 (2007).
08 See Paul F. Diehl et al., Theoretical Specifications of Enduring Rivalries:
Applications to the India-Pakistan Case, in THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT: AN
ENDURING RIVALRY 27 (T.V. Paul ed., 2005).
109 EDWARD D. MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES GO TO WAR (2005).
110 Jeffrey Pickering & Mark Peceny, Forcing Democracy at Gunpoint, 50 INT'L
STUD. Q. 539, 552 (2006).
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More likely, the path to rivalry termination and ultimately
friendly relations is achieved through diplomacy. In his seminal
study of twenty enemy relationships that evolved into friendships,
Charles Kupchan inductively sees the end of rivalries as a process
involving a series of steps.111 In the first stage, there is a conciliatory
gesture ("unilateral accommodation") rather than a provocative
military action.112 The second stage involves reciprocal and positive
responses ("reciprocal restraint") to such overtures by the other rival,
often leaving the most difficult issues for later negotiation.1 13
Diplomacy takes over, and there are a series of gestures and actions
over a period of years that reinforce the march toward peaceful
relations. Any disputes are resolved peacefully, without jeopardizing
overall relations. There is a shift from diplomats to the general public
in the third stage. 114 Cooperation extends to all sorts of political,
economic, and social realms ("societal integration").115 The fourth
and final phase ("generation of new narratives and identities")
involves an attitudinal transformation in the rival states in which
peoples come to identify themselves as friends, rather than
enemies.116
Overall, preventive and related military action tends to
produce extremely limited results in delaying future military threats
from opponents, and then only in a few instances is a decisive
outcome achieved. More problematic is that Bush Doctrine actions
tend to prolong rivalries and reinforce hostility. The conditions
associated with ending rivalries, and therefore long-term security
threats, are not achieved by military force, but are actually the
opposite of such actions.
.." CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, How ENEMIES BECOME FRIENDS: THE SOURCES OF
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C. What About Terrorism?
The previous analyses focused exclusively on the application
of the Bush Doctrine against other states. The interstate focus is in
many ways justifiable as states are the primary actors in the
international legal system, and many of the precedents that would
emerge from the adoption of the Bush Doctrine would apply to
states. In addition, despite initial rhetoric targeted at terrorists, in his
own application of the Doctrine, President Bush's focus moved from
terrorist groups to countries that harbored terrorists, and to countries
that are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.117 State
sponsors also play important roles in facilitating terrorism.118 Thus, a
focus on state-to-state interaction is warranted, even when the
prevailing threat involves potential terrorist action.
Although interstate behavior is worth examining for the
purpose of consideration of an emerging Bush Doctrine, the rationale
for its adoption would be considerably stronger if it could be
demonstrated that such a doctrine would have the effect of reducing
global terrorism as well. Unfortunately, unlike the analyses
conducted above, an examination of the effectiveness of military
actions on terrorist strikes is considerably more difficult. The Bush
Doctrine is designed to prevent or deter certain actions, and
evaluating effectiveness is predicated on identifiable targets and
observable behavior.119 Unlike enemy states, there is no
comprehensive and publicly available list of terrorist groups that
might be labeled as potential aggressors. The desire of denying
publicity to such groups along with various diplomatic incentives to
carry out actions covertly means that preventive actions are not
transparent to outside analysts. Thus, it is very difficult to assess the
utility of past actions that might have been designed to prevent or
deter terrorist acts. The ability to target the leaders of individual
terrorist groups may be a better option. The legality of such targeted
117 Cameron G. Thies & Leigh A. Galatas, Assessing the Bush Doctrine, in THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSING THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 79, 87 (John
Davis ed., 2004).
118 Tyler Cowen, Terrorism As Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications, 128 PUB.
CHOICE 233, 242-43 (2006).
''9 See Part IV.
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assassinations are open for discussion and the ease of using drone
aircrafts does not obviate the legal impediments.120
Even with identifiable groups, the precise military targets
needed for preventive action are not often present with Bush
Doctrine initiatives. Strikes against states can be directed at overt
capabilities (e.g., nuclear reactors, air fields), and these are largely
transparent. Yet there is often no equivalent for terrorist groups.
Terrorist training camps are a preferred target; beyond those
facilities, there are only a few hard targets suitable for military raids.
Terrorists operate covertly and often without identifiable geographic
locations. Such groups also deliberately operate in populated areas,
such that any strikes will almost inevitably lead to civilian casualties.
Thus, there is considerable doubt as to whether preventive military
actions are well-suited to combating prospective terrorist attacks.
Furthermore, the difficulty the U.S. experienced with its efforts to kill
Osama Bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda officials suggests that such
goals are not easily accomplished. Regardless, it is unclear whether
terrorist acts would decrease as a result of any such efforts.
It is also difficult to observe the success of any preventive
actions. By definition, success for Bush Doctrine actions involves the
absence of terrorist acts. Yet this presumes that groups would have
launched an attack had the potential victim not taken preventive
action. This is all but impossible to prove, and thus we are unable to
assess claims by former Vice-President Richard Cheney that the
success of the U.S.'s war on terror is indicated by the absence of any
terrorist attack on U.S. soil since September 11th, 2001. Deterrence is a
notoriously difficult thing to measure quantitatively even in state-to-
state relations,121 and the hurdles are even more difficult when
considering obscure actors such as terrorist groups.
120 See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, The International Law of Drones, INSIGHTS
(The Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 12, 2010 (discussing the
international legal issues related to innovation and use of attack drones).
121 Compare Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, Rational Deterrence Theory:
I Think, Therefore I Deter, 41 WORLD POL. 208, 224 (1989) (arguing that deterrence
theory is a poor predictor of critical cases of strategic behavior and an equally poor
guide to policy), with Paul Huth & Bruce Russett, Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor
Makes a Difference, 42 WORLD POL. 466 (1990) (arguing that many of the supposed
issues with deterrence theory stems from methodological errors and faulty
understanding of scientific methods, and not the actual theory).
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At best, we can detect failed terrorism attempts by
considering the number and types of foiled terrorist plots, such as
those directed at Times Square in New York City in 2010.122 Such
attempts reveal the success of other counter-terrorist actions rather
than preventive ones. Indeed, the fact that groups or individuals tried
and failed to carry out terrorist actions, and got as far as they did,
suggests that they were not prevented or deterred by any military
actions. Yet even failures do not necessarily provide suitable
evidence against the Bush Doctrine or any preventive action.
Attribution of an attack to a specific group that was targeted for
preventive military action is necessary to make a conclusion that such
action was ineffective. Yet, not all attacks can be directly linked to
particular groups, and there are some strong incentives for terrorists
to hide their responsibility for attacks. All this is not to say that
terrorists cannot be deterred, but only that this is difficult to evaluate
when considering the use of force. Indeed, there is evidence that
deterrence is possible with respect to terrorists, 123 most likely by
limiting benefits (e.g., target hardening and other protective actions)
from terrorist acts. Less coercive strategies are likely to be more
effective and less resource intensive than those associated with
military strikes.124
Although data-based assessment is not open to us for
assessing the impact of Bush Doctrine actions against terrorists, we
might infer some conclusions based on the effectiveness of retaliatory
raids against terrorists.125 Admittedly, retaliation is post hoc and
occurs after an attack has occurred, rather than in response to
impending harm. Such actions are not only designed to punish
groups or states supporting terrorist actions, but there is the hope
122 Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (May 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/
02timessquare.html?pagewanted all
123 Robert F. Trager & Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be
Done, 30 INT'L SEC. 87, 88 (2006) (rejecting the idea that deterrence of terrorism is
not possible, arguing that many terrorists can be deterred from actions that harm
targeted states by, among other things, holding their political goals at risk, as oppose
to their life or liberty).
1
24 See id at 120-22.
125 The legality of such retaliatory action is subject to a different analysis, even as
inferences about their effects might be applicable here.
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that military strikes will disable terrorist capabilities for future acts or
deter such acts because of the costs imposed by the strikes.
Fortunately, there is scholarly literature (see some samples below) on
the effects of retaliatory raids on subsequent terrorist activities. These
studies are a mixture of game-theory analyses; single or multiple case
studies; and statistical analyses that compare the frequency of
terrorist attacks before and after retaliatory raids. Despite this
methodological diversity, there is consensus among them that such
military actions are not necessarily a useful tool of counter-terrorism
efforts.
For example, even if preventive military action against
terrorists in other states were legal, the incentives that states would
have to use this technique would not change. Preventing military
action in the future is a "public good" because the benefits of
retaliation (no terrorist attacks) are open to all and are not exclusive
to the state launching the retaliatory action. States historically
underprovide such public goods because of the free-rider problem
where many states will wait for others to take the military and
diplomatic risks accompanying preventive military strikes and still
enjoy the favorable outcomes.126 Thus, one might anticipate that
preventive strikes will not occur as frequently as might be required
(assuming effectiveness). Furthermore, from studies of free-riding
with respect to military actions and defense burdens, we can also
anticipate that major power states would be those most likely to
exercise actions in order to provide for the public good,127 illustrating
another instance in which the Bush Doctrine would be exercised
primarily by a narrow set of states.
Although there might be an under provision of why
retaliation raids are rarely used, the real question is: do they actually
deter future attacks? Cynthia Lum and her colleagues conducted a
systematic meta-analysis of all counter-terrorism research on the
126 Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandier, Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis, 49 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 186, 191 (2005); Dwight R. Lee, Free
Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight Against Terrorism, 78 AM. EcON. REV. 22, 25
(1988).
127 John R. Oneal & Paul F. Diehl, The Theory of Collective Action and NATO
Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests, 47 POL. RES. Q. 373, 374-75, 378 (1994).
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effectiveness of various techniques, such as airport screenings.128
Included in that review was an assessment of military retaliation, and
they concluded:
Military retaliations can increase terrorism in the
short run and, over the long run, may not affect
terrorism at all. . . . While military retaliations may be
seen as justified for reasons other than the prevention
and deterrence of future terrorism (for example as
punishment or detection of offenders), the costs of
such interventions may not only be monetary but
actually lead to a short-term increase in these events.
At the same time, military interventions are an
example of how some strategies might vary
dramatically in terms of short-run versus long-run
effects. 129
The unintended consequence of actually increasing terrorist
attacks stems from the effect of the military action on such groups.
Although some training bases and other capabilities might be
reduced in the short-term, military attacks can also have the negative
effect of enhancing terrorist recruitment, as individuals join such
groups in reaction to the preventive actions.13oSang-Whan Choi
reaches similar conclusions in his study of U.S. military intervention
128 See Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy & Alison Sherley, Are Counter-Terrorism
Strategies Effective? The Results of the Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-
Terrorism Research, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 489, 490-93 (2006) (discus-
sing the need for further support of counter-terrorism efforts in the U.S.); see also
Bryan Brophy-Baermann & John A. C. Conybeare, Retaliating Against Terrorism:
Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules Versus Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 196, 202-08 (1994) (discussing the policies of retaliation against terrorist and
the need to increase responding to terrorism).
129 Cynthia Lum et al., supra note 128, at 510.
"O See B. Peter Rosendorff & Todd Sandier, Too Much of a Good Thing? The
Proactive Response Dilemma, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 657, 659 (2004) (analyzing
the response of targets to proactive activity); see also Robert A. Pape, The Strategic
Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 343, 344, 356 (2003); Trager &
Zagorcheva, supra note 123, at 105-6.
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(more extensive than merely strikes) over the period 1970-2005.131 He
also found that such military action subsequently precipitated more
terrorist attacks than in prior periods;132 and that there may be some
value in limiting future attacks against the U.S only when terrorist or
rebel groups are the specific targets.133
Not only are preventive military attacks counter-productive
with respect to terrorism, other superior alternatives are available.134
Empirical evidence suggests that options such as strengthening the
rule of law in target countries, 135 the provision of foreign aid, and
support for education are effective means to prevent terrorism.136
These actions undermine potential support for terrorists by
redressing the various conditions, including poverty, that are
breeding grounds for terrorist group formation and expansion; there
are even conditions under which negotiation with terrorists might be
a viable strategy.137 In contrast to preventive strikes, foreign aid and
education support are already legal under international law and
provide positive externalities for the international system as a
whole.138 Economic means are also likely to be much less expensive
forms of counter-terrorism, especially when the curtailment of civil
liberties, and the costs of related spending are taken into account.139
Improved homeland defenses may also be more effective means of
providing counter-terrorist than preventive strikes. This is especially
See Seung-Whan Choi, Does U.S. Military Intervention Reduce or Increase
Terrorism? 24 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n Annual Meeting, Working Paper, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900375 (analyzing the connection between
United States military intervention efforts and terrorist attacks).
132 Id.
13 See id
134 See Cynthia Lum et al., supra note 128, at 502, 508.
135 Seung-Whan Choi, Fighting Terrorism Through the Rule of Law?, 54 J.
CONFLICT RESOL., 940, 941 (2010).
See Jean-Paul Azam & Vronique Thelen, The Roles of Foreign Aid and
Education in the War On Terror, 135 PUB. CHOICE, 375, 386-89 (2008).
m
7
KAREN A. FESTE, TERMINATE TERRORISM: FRAMING, GAMING, AND NEGOTIATING
CONFLICTS49 (2010).
See generally Paul Collier & David Dollar, Can the World Cut Poverty in Halp.
How Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Aeet International Development Goals,
29 WORLD DEV. 1787-1802 (2001).
139 William A. Niskanen, The Several Costs of Responding to the Threat of
Terrorism, 128 PUB. CHOICE 351, 352-53 (2006).
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true because, even as the effects of increased homeland security are
unambiguous, 140 a perceived sense of military occupation or
targeting is seen as a strong correlate to the use of suicide tactics.141
Gary Ackerman and William Potter offer an extensive list of
recommendations to forestall catastrophic nuclear terrorism; several
are noted above and they add a series of others, including securing
nuclear materials. 142 Most importantly for our purposes, none of the
suggestions involve preventive military action as advocated by the
Bush Doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
International legal rules on the use of military force have been
notoriously slow to reflect changes in contemporary security threats
and modern warfare. Yet, beyond evaluating whether proposed
modifications meet the normative test reflecting the values of the
international community, we have suggested that any new rules meet
an empirical test: that the rules achieve the purposes for which they
were designed. Assuming that empirical evidence can be assembled,
this is a useful rule of thumb for any potential new rule of law. It is
especially appropriate for international law concerning the use of
military force. Such decisions cannot be left to the discretion of policy
makers as they might be in other areas of policy. Uses of military
force are unique in their high costs in lives and property, as well as
their risks of escalation; these factors have been the primary
motivating force for the creation of legal rules severely limiting their
use. Presumption should be against modifying legal rules to permit
greater uses of forces, unless clear benefits can be demonstrated. The
proposed norm that states could use military force proactively to
meet threats that were not immediate or imminent was applied to the
Bush Doctrine in this Article.
Our general conclusion is that the Bush Doctrine fails to pass
the empirical test. Using military force in a preventive fashion
provides very limited, if any value, to states that employ this
140 Curtis S. Signorino & Ahmer Tarar, .A Unified Theory and Test of Extended
Intermediate Deterrence, 50 AM. J. POL. Scl. 586, 597 (2006).
141 Pape, supra note 130, at 357.
142 Ackerman & Potter, supra note 62, at 437-41.
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strategy. At best, there is a small chance of victory in such
circumstances, and this requires a full-scale war. The utility of
preventive strikes diminishes tremendously in attacks short of war,
and indeed the minimal success rate (around 10%) is no better than
using coercive diplomacy by merely threatening force rather than
actually using it. The success rate improves somewhat for major
power states, but not enough to justify the use of force, or perhaps to
overcome the establishment of a right that only a limited set of actors
can exercise.
Positive longer-term effects of Bush Doctrine actions were
also not apparent. Preventive actions did not significantly delay the
appearance of new security threats and indeed such actions produce
the conditions that enhance the maintenance of international
rivalries, rather than contributing to their resolution. Finally,
available evidence suggests that preventive strikes are not well-
suited to terrorist threats, and states might be reluctant to employ
them in any case. Studies of retaliation to terrorist attacks find little
value to the former, with no long-term deterrent effects.
The limitation of the Bush Doctrine in achieving its objectives
is only one element of the balance ledger on the desirability of
encompassing it under the international law umbrella. Although this
article has concentrated on effectiveness, the viability of the Bush
Doctrine must also account for the costs of any military action, and
these are highly scenario-dependent. We did not address, but one
must certainly consider, a range of other costs associated with
military action. These include the financial costs associated with the
maintenance of specialized military weapons and forces, as well as
the actual expenditures associated with preventive military actions; a
single, quick strike against a terrorist training base might involve
minimal resources, whereas a protracted war is obviously much
more costly.
Beyond a conventional cost-benefit analysis, one should also
consider further attendant and often unintended consequences that
follow from preventive military action. Above we noted that
retaliatory raids in the name of anti-terrorism actually increased
terrorist attacks in the short-term and might enhance terrorist
recruitment efforts. Yet there might be other effects that result from
preventive strikes, especially those that fail to achieve their prime
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objective. Jessica Stern and Jonathan Wiener list several undesirable
consequences that have occurred after the United States launched the
invasion of Iraq to counter purported weapons of mass destruction
there.143 These included distracting the United States from greater
threats posed by Al Qaeda, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea
respectively. The Iraq war has also reduced U.S. Army recruiting
rates, created political divisions among NATO allies, and has risked
producing an "under-reaction" when real threats arise in the
future.144 Most seriously, the use of preventive force by the United
States might encourage other states to launch preventive military
actions. 145 Of course, the net effect might or might not serve
American interests, but American installations and personnel could
be the targets of such action.146
The Bush Doctrine applied broadly is unlikely to produce
outcomes that serve its central purposes. Yet, one can construct
scenarios in which the application of the Bush Doctrine is desirable
and effective, and indeed there is empirical evidence of that; most
would likely agree that the Israeli strike against emerging Syrian
nuclear capabilities in 2007 enhanced security in the region with
minimal costs. Is it possible to encourage the Bush Doctrine in those
circumstances, while preventing its use in the overwhelming majority
of circumstances when it would be ineffective or when its use might
be exploited? Incorporating the Bush Doctrine into international law
is probably not the answer because when rules of the use of military
force become more permissive, states are more likely to use such
force. 147 Thus, expanding the use of military actions is likely to
produce more failures.
Paradoxically, one could argue that keeping the Bush
Doctrine illegal might lead to desirable ends. With respect to torture,
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the practice should be




147 Benjamin Appel, The Politics of Self-Defense: The Role of International Law on
the Use of Force in International Crises, (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n Annual Meeting,
Working Paper 2010).
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kept illegal, but permitted under some circumstances. 148 By doing so,
the illegality will discourage the use of torture, except under extreme
circumstances when it might have utility and be used as a last resort.
In a similar vein, Jacob Cogan introduces the notion of "operational
noncompliance," in which violations of international law serve an
important purpose: "[Nioncompliance . . . keeps a partially effective
system . .. operational by . . . bridging the enforcement gap created
by inadequate community mechanisms of control." 149
Putting these together, one might argue that the Bush
Doctrine should remain illegal, but infrequently practiced, as it
would serve the needs of international law when traditional legal
mechanisms for dealing with terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction are ineffective. The problem with this approach is that
there is an underlying assumption that the practice (here preventive
military action) is effective.150 Yet we know from the empirical
analysis in this article that the effectiveness of the Bush Doctrine is
extremely limited, and therefore preventive military actions do not
seem to be good candidates for operational noncompliance
mechanisms. Furthermore, there is no way to ensure that the actual
and limited uses of the illegal preventive military action will be the
ones that are part of the small subset of effective actions.
In the end, legalizing the Bush Doctrine is not likely to
produce the intended outcomes because of the considerable risks of
producing undesirable consequences. Keeping the Bush Doctrine
illegal seems to be the most sensible strategy, and even then,
preventive military action does not appear to serve legal or other
purposes when actors decide to violate established legal rules by
launching military strikes.
148 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?,
104 MICH. L. REV., 671, 707 (2006).
149 Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE J.
INT'L L., 191 (2006).
150 Indeed, Cogan, id. at 208-09, lists a number of requirements for operational
noncompliance mechanisms (e.g., necessity, precision), but effectiveness in
achieving the original purpose is not one of them, indicating that effectiveness is
assumed, and the logic of his argument is consistent with that interpretation.
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